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Two approaches to transformation of the South African fishery industry were adopted after the advent of democracy: 
the broadening of access rights to new rights holders (individuals and companies) through state intervention (external 
transformation); and market-led change within state black economic empowerment policy (internal transformation). The 
government has largely missed its opportunity to ensure the restructuring of the industry was managed in such a way as to 
achieve broader societal goals such as the alleviation of poverty and upliftment of fishing communities. While some progress 
has been made in terms of the reallocation of quotas to previously disadvantaged individuals and groups, real problems 
remain. Much ‘transformation’ within established fishing companies in terms of advancing historically disadvantaged 
individuals and groups is cosmetic. Not all bona fide fishers were able to secure quotas. Many quota allocations were too small 
to be financially viable. New entrants to the industry do not have sufficient access to capital, infrastructure, equipment and 
technical know-how to establish viable businesses. Certain rights holders are quota holders on paper only. The state should 
intervene more vigorously to support new entrants by providing access to capital, business and management skills, providing 
institutional support, protecting bona fide fishing communities, and setting up an effective watchdog to monitor real progress 
towards transformation of the industry linked to granting long-term fishing rights.
Introduction 
The African National Congress (ANC) contested the 
April 1994 elections on the basis of  a vision of  ‘a better 
life for all’, to be achieved through its people-centred 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
policy framework (ANC 1994). This created expectations 
that many in the ‘marginalised’ fishing communities would 
secure their own fishing rights and small businesses. It was 
hoped that the revised fisheries policy would deliver on 
these expectations, while at the same time maintaining an 
internationally competitive fishing industry (Isaacs 2005). 
Due to pressure from established economic interests, 
in 1996 the new government shifted its macro-economic 
policy to a ‘home-grown’ structural adjustment programme 
called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
macroeconomic framework (Gear). This resulted largely 
in abandonment of  the key principles and policies of  the 
RDP and the adoption of  neo-liberal economic principles 
including privatisation, subsidy removal, and downsizing 
of  the public sector; and encouragement of  small black 
entrepreneurs. Gear was aimed at achieving equity and 
redistribution through economic growth and job creation 
(Bond 2000).1 The authors of  Gear imagined poverty 
alleviation would be achieved through the ‘trickle-down’ 
effect of  a new group of  entrepreneurs who would establish 
labour-intensive small, medium and micro enterprises 
(SMMEs). This was in direct contrast to the RDP’s 
approach of  redistributing wealth through interventionist 
state policies based on socialist ideology.2  The shift to Gear 
resulted in large numbers of  bona fide fishers being excluded 
up-front from the formal allocation process because they 
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could not demonstrate their entrepreneurship through 
being able to complete application forms and engage 
in related bureaucratic procedures without help (Isaacs 
2005). 
In order to understand how the transformation process 
was supposed to contribute to poverty alleviation, one needs 
to understand the capital accumulation/ wealth generation 
and safety net functions of  enterprise development and job 
creation. Béné’s framework on poverty alleviation (2004) 
provides a useful analytical tool. This author argues that 
vulnerable individuals or groups of  individuals are usually 
at risk of  being exploited by persons or groups that are 
in positions of  power because they are economically 
insecure.3 In this publication, we will use the concepts of  
poverty, vulnerability and entrepreneurship to look at the 
contribution (or failure) of  fisheries to the improvement 
of  the livelihoods of  coastal communities, including the 
proposed mechanism of  co-management (see Hauck & 
Sowman 2003 and Hara & Raakjær Nielsen 2003).
The shift in macroeconomic policy was an important 
factor in relation to ‘transformation’ of  the fisheries sector 
in that the focus for transforming the sector moved from 
re-allocation of  access rights to one of  promoting black 
economic empowerment (BEE). BEE was focused mainly 
on addressing racial and gender imbalances within the 
industry. It took the form of  offering ownership of  shares 
in established enterprises to historically disadvantaged 
individuals (HDIs) organised in empowerment groups and/
or labour unions, transferring technical and management 
skills to HDIs, and promoting HDI employees to positions 
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vulnerability of  the workers within the existing established 
companies under BEE schemes, and new rights holders 
and the SMMEs that have been established after achieving 
access to fishing rights. 
‘Transformation’ is not defined in the Marine Living 
Resources Act of  1998 or in any other legislative or policy 
document (Witbooi forthcoming 2005). The vision of  the 
government’s new policy is probably what was meant by 
‘transformation’ in the Act:
the marine resources are a national asset and part of  the 
heritage of  the people of  South Africa, present and future, 
and should be managed and developed for the benefit 
of  the country as a whole, especially those communities 
whose livelihoods depended on these resources; and that the 
allocation of  the resources would be made on an equitable 
basis, with a view to ensuring the long-term sustainability 
of  the resources and their healthy condition for present and 
future generations.
Two approaches to transformation were being used: 
the broadening of  access rights to new rights holders 
(individuals and companies) through state intervention 
(external transformation); and market-led change within 
state BEE policy (internal transformation). The Department 
of  Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) branch 
of  Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) was given 
the responsibility for external transformation. The new 
Constitution with its Bill of  Rights and the new fisheries 
policy paved the way for new entrants to enter this sector, 
but MCM struggled with managing and administering 
this process. A complicating factor was that the sector 
was already oversubscribed – making space for new 
entrants would require cutting existing allocations. Internal 
transformation was to take place through market-based 
reforms within companies through change in ownership, 
giving workers more benefits and share schemes, assisting 
in the empowerment of  new right holders and so on. This 
market-based intervention impacted on the extent of  state 
intervention from the start, leaving little room for a more 
community-based empowerment option to transformation 
in the industry (See Hersoug 2002).
The responsibility of  the state through MCM is to 
ensure that the equity and redistribution are achieved 
without endangering the economic stability of  the industry 
and sustainability of  the resource. From the very beginning, 
it was clear that the goals of  transformation would be in 
conflict with the principles of  resource management since 
meeting the expectations of  the many potential new entrants 
would not be in line with the limited room for expansion 
that sustainable resource management entailed. Adding to 
this was the fear among the established companies that 
allowing too many new entrants could create chaos and 
result in economic instability in the industry. Several factors 
impeded or were used to block or slow transformation, 
especially by those already in the industry.
Constraints to transformation in the 
early years 
• Unwilling sellers, unwilling buyers: As a matter of  
principle, HDIs and HDI groups were unwilling to ‘buy’ 
fishing rights that they felt they had been dispossessed 
of  under apartheid. There were expectations that 
government would put this travesty right by simply 
taking these rights back from established companies 
and redistributing them to HDIs after the advent of  
democracy. The established companies were equally 
unwilling to share, sell or give up their fishing rights, 
arguing that they had spent decades building up their 
companies.
• Foot-dragging tactics: Established companies used 
foot-dragging tactics to delay redistribution by employing 
leading lawyers to find loopholes in the new fisheries 
policy and to litigate on all large-scale cuts in their 
quota allocations. Many courts ruled in favour of  the 
established industry, hindering government from taking 
large portions of  their quota allocations to accommodate 
new entrants to the industry (Witbooi forthcoming 
2005). 
• Court challenges on administrative grounds: 
Numerous allocations by the former Quota Board 
under the old Sea Fisheries Act were successfully 
challenged in court on administrative grounds from 
1993, following the promulgation of  the 1993 Quota 
Board guidelines (Witbooi 2005). The constitutional 
entrenchment of  the right to just administrative action 
reinforced the strength of  administrative remedies, as 
evidenced by the number of  court cases after 1996. 
For example, the first quota allocations made under the 
MLRA were successfully challenged and set aside for 
reconsideration on various administrative grounds. 
• Alliances between large companies and labour 
unions to oppose transformation: Established 
companies were able to secure the support of  their 
largely black labour unions to oppose transformation 
using the slogan ‘a cut in our quota allocations will result 
in a cut in jobs’. The unions (especially the Food and 
Allied Workers’ Union – FAWU) traded their support 
for maintaining existing quota allocations for better 
working conditions and improved benefits for their 
members (pension funds, shareholding schemes, 
medical aid, and improved health and safety). The irony 
was that FAWU is an affiliate of  the Congress of  South 
African Trade Unions (Cosatu), one of  three partners in 
the ruling ANC Alliance. The alliance between unions 
and employers against redistribution of  fishing rights 
further marginalised poor bona fide fishers who had 
expected fishing rights after apartheid. 
• Constitutional protection of  property rights: The 
Constitution provides that nobody may be deprived of  
property except in terms of  law of  general application 
(the ‘property clause’). This together with the 
government’s commitment to support market forces 
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effectively gave established companies a veto against 
the reform of  the fishing industry. 
Internal transformation
Most established companies claim to have implemented 
internal changes that meet the requirements provided by 
DEAT guidelines (2001a; 2001b). 
• Shareownership: The established industry quickly 
responded to internal transformation requirements. 
For example Oceana Fishing Group sold half  of  its 
equity to a black empowerment consortium4 while 
Premier Fishing shares ownership with Sekunjalo and 
Pamodzi/Foodcorp owns Marine Products. Allowing a 
larger degree of  black ownership strategically put such 
companies in positions of  strength for maintaining or 
even increasing their quota holdings since most of  these 
empowerment groups had good political connections. 
• Shareholding schemes: Companies like Sea Harvest 
and Irvin & Johnson started on a fairly small scale, 
offering limited shareholding ownership for employees 
at favourable prices (Business Report, 16 November 
2000). Although employee shareholding constituted a 
small percentage of  the total stock, the symbolic effect 
was considered important.
• Change in leadership/management structures: The 
established companies wasted no time in bringing in 
HDI leaders in an attempt to transform the leadership 
structures of  their companies. Within the labour unions 
this was regarded as a window dressing exercise since 
some of  these individuals were given the privileges of  
power but not the right to make crucial decisions.
• Infrastructure and know-how: The major dilemma that 
faced many new entrants was the lack of  infrastructure 
(vessels, processing facilities and marketing networks) 
and business know-how. A possible, seemingly obvious, 
solution to this dilemma was the formation of  joint 
venture and business partnerships as promoted by the 
new fisheries law (the MLRA). 
In spite of  all of  this, most new entrants complain that 
the changes that have taken place have not changed the 
power dynamics in the industry as a whole or within 
individual companies. Because established companies own 
most of  the infrastructure, they retain control of  fishing, 
processing and marketing operations, even where new 
entrants have entered into joint ventures with them. The 
prices charged for these services make it very difficult for 
new entrants to succeed. Established companies recoup 
their transaction costs through reduced prices for fish from 
new entrants or inflated costs for their services (Raakjær 
Nielsen and Hara forthcoming 2005). Top management of  
most companies remains largely white. Where blacks have 
been given top positions, their ability to make management 
decisions is frequently constrained or absent. Most 
‘internal transformation’ appears to be window dressing. 
The lack of  infrastructure and business know-how among 
new entrants and the lack of  real black ownership and 
power within established companies leaves black workers 
and entrepreneurs vulnerable to manipulation and 
exploitation. 
External transformation – MCM’s 
perspective 
Eventually, everyone, including the established companies, 
had to accept that some re-allocation of  rights was 
unavoidable. MCM’s major indicator of  transformation has 
been quantitative – that is, the number of  new individuals 
(mostly HDIs) or HDI fishing companies that have been 
granted access rights. MCM’s stated achievements after ten 
years of  ‘transformation’ are, for example, in the abalone, 
West Coast rock lobster, small pelagic and deep-sea hake 
fisheries (DEAT 2004):
• In the abalone fishery, the number of  rights holders 
increased from five in 1992 to 271 in 2002. The five 
original quota holding companies retained 49.5% of  
the total commercial allocation while original abalone 
divers received 17.5%. The 228 new entrants under the 
limited commercial category got the remaining 33% in 
allocations of  202 quotas of  430kg and 26 quotas of  
200kg. Individuals held 95% of  the limited commercial 
allocations. A total of  87.5% of  the companies holding 
commercial abalone quotas were classified as SMMEs. 
According to DEAT (2004), 90% of  the global abalone 
TAC was allocated to SMMEs in 2002.
• In the West Coast rock lobster fishery the number of  
rights holders increased from 39 in 1992 to 745 in 2002. 
While the top ten companies had held 57% of  the quota 
in 1992, this had been reduced to 36% in 2002. Ninety 
percent of  right holders were classified as SMMEs 
and 66% of  these companies were HDI-owned. In 
2003, a further 274 individuals were awarded limited 
commercial fishing rights in the east of  Cape Hangklip 
area. In the limited commercial sector, the allocations 
ranged from 200kg to 1.5 tons (average 712kg). A total 
of  91.5% of  the limited commercial quota was awarded 
to HDI or HDI-owned micro enterprises. Thus 70% of  
the global TAC was HDI-controlled.
• Whereas there were only 12 rights holders in the small 
pelagics sector in 1990, by 2002 the number had 
grown to 91 sardine and 70 anchovy rights holders 
(Sauer et al. 2003; DEAT 2004). About 85% of  these 
were considered to be SMMEs. Furthermore, 73% of  
the rights holders were HDIs and these held 75% of  
the pelagic TAC. Most of  these got 0.3% of  the TAC as 
their annual quota for the duration of  the medium term 
rights. This means the access of  HDI rights holders to 
the pelagic sector had increased tenfold (from 7% to 
70%) over the 10 years 1992–2002. Despite this, the 
established companies have maintained their allocation 
(in terms of  volume) of  anchovy and sardine due to the 
increase in TAC.
• While only 21 predominantly white-owned companies 
had rights to exploit deep-sea hake in 1992, the 
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number of  rights holders had increased to 56 by 2000. 
The top five companies held 92% of  the TAC in 1992. 
This had been reduced to less than 74% by 2002 (Sauer 
et al. 2003). Furthermore, government claims that the 
large companies had been compelled to transform in 
terms of  their ownership and management structures 
(DEAT 2004). In addition, 42% of  companies in the 
sector were classified as SMMEs, and 74% of  rights 
holders were deemed to be majority HDI-owned 
and managed by 2002. According to DEAT, HDI 
shareholding in the sector had increased from 0.5% in 
1992 to 25% in 2002.
These reported results need to be compared to the extent 
of  internal transformation that took place within the 
established companies, that is, the link between HDI 
ownership and quota allocation. External transformation is 
directly linked to internal transformation and it is situated 
in the need to maintain stability and efficiency within the 
fishing industry. A consequence of  the direct link between 
internal and external transformation means that there 
was very little TAC left for MCM to allocate to the new 
entrants. The industry’s long-term economic viability could 
have been compromised by the short-term political goal of  
MCM – that is, to show the extent to which it has allocated 
rights to new entrants. 
External transformation – the reality
Impressive as these figures would appear, they do not 
describe the realities on the ground. The guidelines for 
award of  medium-term rights (DEAT 2001a; 2001b) 
outlined the objectives and assessment principles for re-
allocation of  fishing rights as being: ‘ability of  applicants 
to invest in the industry and to demonstrate that they 
would be actively involved and committed to the industry’, 
‘past performance and capacity to harvest and process 
the resource’, ‘potential for significant impact on local 
community economies and development’ and ‘the degree 
of  risk of  new entrants becoming paper quota holders’ 
(Raakjær Nielsen and Hara forthcoming 2005). DEAT 
(2001a) categorically stated that while the department was 
committed to bringing in new entrants into the industry, 
the potential of  such new entrants to enter, participate in 
and share the risks of  the industry had to be examined in 
the light of  the degree of  their knowledge, experience, 
their fishing plans and business acumen. It was further 
stated that where joint ventures had been entered into, 
these had to be capable of  validly empowering to the 
rights holders (DEAT 2001a:5–6; 2001b:6–7). In reality, 
most new entrants are finding it very difficult to establish 
themselves in the industry. A number of  reasons have been 
put forward for the problems they are encountering: 
• the quotas that they receive are too small to set up, 
establish and operate economically viable fishing 
businesses
• banks do not accept fishing quotas as collateral for 
loans, making it difficult to raise investment capital 
• new entrants lack the technical and managerial skills 
to survive in the industry and no assistance is being 
provided in this regard
• it is very difficult for new fishing companies to compete 
with or break into the monopolistic business systems 
and structures that established large companies have 
created and fiercely guard in order to maintain thier 
compettitive advantage.
In view of  the foregoing, the new entrants have adopted 
four main survival strategies:
• entering into joint venture agreements involving 
catching or processing or marketing with established 
companies
• pooling their quotas with other right holders and jointly 
obtaining a vessel to exploit the pooled quota
• selling their fishing rights outright to someone (usually 
an established company) with the ability to make use of  
the quota as their own (such rights holders are referred 
to as ‘paper quota holders’)
• acquiring fishing rights for several species (if  they own 
a vessel) in order to create an economically viable quota 
‘package’.
Because the first three strategies are the most common, 
the number of  rights holders actively taking part in 
fishing operations is actually at least 50% lower than 
the official number of  rights holders. For example, an 
analysis by Raakjær Nielsen and Hara (2005) suggests that 
approximately 25 of  the 51 new anchovy fishing rights 
holders sold their quota to vessel owners or processing 
companies. This accounted for about 25% of  the TAC. 
In deep-sea hake trawling the 53 rights holders have been 
consolidated into less than 20 operational clusters through 
joint venture agreements. Joint venture arrangements 
were being used by both sides for their own benefit. For 
new entrants, this would demonstrate that they were 
actively involved in the industry while, for the established 
companies, joint ventures provide increased raw material 
for processing. If  the motivation for joint ventures was 
the transfer of  skills in management and operations, it has 
rarely been successful – most new entrants are not gaining 
any skills that would enable them stand on their own as 
independent and thriving companies. 
As pointed out earlier, government’s policy goal was to 
award rights to new (mainly black) entrepreneurs. In turn 
these could form viable fishing businesses in rural coastal 
areas and so contribute towards poverty alleviation by 
creating jobs. Little progress has been made so far. Apart 
from the lack of  skills transfer, another major stumbling 
block has been that the sizes of  quotas that have been 
awarded to most new entrants do not meet the criteria 
of  being minimum viable quotas (MVQ). For example, 
most new entrants in the abalone and West Coast rock 
lobster fisheries were awarded quotas under the ‘limited 
commercial’ category. Under this category, the maximum 
size of  individual quotas is 430kg (minimum 200kg) for 
abalone and 1.5 tons (minimum 200kg) for West Coast 
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rock lobster. The rights holders point out that these quotas 
are fished up within a month or two. Since one fisher could 
not apply to fish for more than one species, there was no 
other source of  livelihood as soon as the annual quota had 
been exhausted. In the small pelagics, most new entrants 
got quotas equivalent to 0.3% of  the TAC. In an industry 
based on high volume/ low profit economics, such quota 
sizes are hardly big enough as basis for investment and 
future planning. 
MVQ were seen as being necessary if  government 
intended to eliminate ‘paper quotas’. The pool of  quotas 
by some new entrants could be seen as an attempt to 
create MVQs. But as Isaacs (2003) demonstrates, most 
new entrants were very unwilling to pool quotas. As 
entrepreneurs, they would prefer to go it alone but 
they face enormous constraints such as lack of  capital, 
infrastructure, support systems and skills. An economic 
sectoral study of  the industry (Sauer et al. 2003) concluded 
that pooling of  resources (as most new entrants were 
forced to do) went against that grain of  entrepreneurship, 
which is usually based on taking business risks. Studies 
on entrepreneurship Schumpeter (1934; 2000); Barth 
(1963; 2000); Maas and Fox (1997) and Von Mises (2000), 
demonstrate and highlight the importance of  individuality 
as one of  the defining traits of  entrepreneurs. 
By allowing too many rights holders into the industry 
and spreading the cake too thin without any support 
systems, government had set up the new entrants for 
failure. As a result, the majority of  new entrants have 
been forced, de facto, to become paper quota holders or 
have been forced to make investments that were not based 
on firm business calculations, but rather to demonstrate 
activity with their quotas in order to qualify for the next 
round of  quota allocation. The non-viable quotas made 
new entrants vulnerable and easy targets for exploitation 
by those in more powerful positions. 
External transformation primarily focused on allocating 
fishing rights to established industries and to SMMEs. In 
the process, a large number of  bona fide fishers had fallen on 
the side, as they could not get into either of  these groups. 
In the 1990s, government had attempted to include this 
group through various interim relief  measures, such 
as the community quotas of  1993, subsistence permits 
to fishers in the Western Cape in 2001, the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, and linefish interim relief  
measures in 2003. The abolishment of  the subsistence 
sector for abalone and West Coast rock lobster and 
institutionalisation of  the ‘limited commercial’ category in 
the Western Cape resulted in most members of  this group 
being excluded. In a province where livelihoods from the 
sea has been extremely important historically and culturally, 
this is proving absolutely debilitating for such coastal 
communities. It is this category of  bona fide fishers (who 
had been excluded through the formal processes) that are 
currently in litigation with government over their rights to 
a livelihood from fishing. The basis of  the litigation is that 
government should recognise and protect their historical 
and cultural right (and entitlement) to a livelihood from 
fishing (with an option to sell their catch) as provided 
for under the Constitution. Additionally, they argue that 
the transformation process that favoured commercial 
enterprises has so far been unsuccessful in job creation 
in their communities. They propose that a 2-mile zone 
should be allocated exclusively for coastal communities for 
livelihood purposes. 
Discussion 
Most of  those who are supposedly benefiting from internal 
transformation efforts in established companies describe 
the changes that have taken place as ‘cosmetic’ and ‘mere 
window dressing’. The external transformation efforts 
of  the state aimed at increasing the numbers of  new 
entrants to the fishing industry. However, since most of  
the beneficiaries have been allocated economically unviable 
quotas, the result has been a multiplicity of  ‘paper quota 
holders’ who usually sell their rights to the established 
companies. Both internal and external transformation 
can thus largely be labelled as cosmetic. The lack of  
clear transformation objectives in government and its 
inability to provide direction for transformation for the 
established companies gave the companies carte blanche to 
restructure their enterprises the way the chose to. Many 
have therefore merely tinkered with their existing profiles 
in order to create the impression that they have changed. 
The lack of  real change within established companies 
can be attributed to the lack of  political will on the part 
of  the state to force through real changes using quotas 
as leverage. The introduction of  neo-liberal macro-
economic policy enhanced the position of  established 
companies by providing them with the argument that their 
ability to change the way they do business was limited 
because stability is vital for them to remain internationally 
competitive in the age of  globalisation. 
A future direction for fisheries in South Africa must 
be based on an assessment of  how effectively internal 
and external transformation processes have addressed 
poverty, job creation and entrepreneurship. Government’s 
policy for poverty alleviation has been through promotion 
of  SMMEs that could new create jobs. This has not been 
much of  a success. With regard to the workers within the 
established companies, the process of  negotiation between 
labour unions and established companies which started in 
1995 to improve working conditions and secure jobs for 
workers seems to have run its course. According to FAWU, 
many permanent jobs are being lost in the fishing industry. 
Established companies have followed the trend towards 
casual, temporary and contract employment. Women 
engaged in processing fish have been most affected by 
casualisation. 
What is needed now
A number of  interventions are necessary in order for 
genuine transformation to occur and the fishing industry 
to contribute towards poverty alleviation.
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• Access to capital: Many of  the new operators in 
the industry did not have any access to credit (other 
than the value of  the quota when sold). Government 
intervention is necessary to support new entrants in 
becoming more competitive and visible in the industry 
through providing access to affordable sources of  
capital. 
• Business and management skills: There is an urgent 
need to establish training, especially in entrepreneurial 
skills. If  the aim is to level the playing field, MCM has a 
responsibility to provide training, in co-operation with 
NGOs and other interested parties. Training should be 
a requirement for all successful new applicants. The 
established industry should be made to share in this 
responsibility. One way of  addressing the training needs 
of  the new entrants is the introduction of  a resource fee 
for leasing a fishing right, which can be used for capacity 
building programmes for new entrants. A resource fee 
is a means by which society can benefit from giving the 
fishing industry the privilege of  using a limited national 
resource. Because most of  the marine resources in 
South Africa are utilised to maximum capacity, only 
a few can be given commercial fishing rights. Such 
a tax could be used for general development projects 
like education, health, and housing and the provision 
of  welfare, especially in fishing communities that 
unsuccessfully appied for fishing rights.
• Institutional support: It is clear from the experience 
of  the last ten years that there is a definite need for 
institutional support to new entrants. Interestingly such 
an approach was used in the 1940s by the government 
of  the time. The Fishing Industry Development 
Corporation (FIDC) was established to, among other 
things, establish rivals to Irvin & Johnson in the deep-
sea hake trawl fishery by granting fishing rights to 
a limited number of  rights-holders in order to enable 
them to develop vertically integrated, economically 
viable companies (van Sittert 2002). What later became 
Sea Harvest only materialised because the FIDC was 
able to support skills development and provide capital. 
Similar human and financial support is needed for 
emerging companies to be able to ably compete with 
established companies. 
• An effective watchdog mechanism: Although 
a verification unit was established for the technical 
vetting and verification of  applications for medium-
term rights, it appears that no unit has been in place 
thereafter to audit progress in internal transformation 
in established companies and ensure new entrants 
are genuinely engaging in the industry. Such a unit is 
supposed to have been vital for vetting this progress 
as part of  the process for awarding the proposed long-
term rights from 2006. In order to avoid having the kind 
of  ‘fox in the henhouse’ situation that led to the Enron 
scandal in the US, it is important that the verification 
unit is completely independent. An independent 
verification unit must have the ability to audit internal 
transformation within companies, joint ventures, as well 
as “paper quota holders” in a credible and transparent 
manner.
• Protection of  bona fide fishers/communities: The 
inshore resources could have largely been left aside 
for bona fide fishers. Government could have used 
this as a bargaining chip against the arguments of  the 
established companies for maintaining their rights in the 
commercial sector. This would have gone a long way in 
providing a source on livelihoods and so contribute 
towards poverty alleviation for these fishers and their 
communities. Regarding capital-intensive fisheries, 
government could have followed the advice from the 
Access Rights Technical Committee (FPDC 1995) and 
acknowledged that it would be very difficult to transform 
these fisheries. Instead these fisheries could have been 
seen as a generator of  funds for development of  coastal 
communities or society at large by imposing a special 
levy on fishing rights, like the resource tax charged in 
Namibia (Melber 2003). Established companies would 
most likely have argued that they already pay tax on 
profit and a levy on fishing rights would thus be unfair. 
It is clear though that, under the medium-term rights, 
established companies were willing to buy and pay for 
fishing rights under many different arrangements. By 
institutionalising transformation through, for example, a 
Trust Development Fund, the transaction costs for the 
established industry to acquire access rights would have 
been substantially lower. 
Co-management
In South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, fisheries co-
management has become a frequently used term to refer 
to involvement of  fishers and fishing communities in order 
improve their livelihoods in a consultative/ collaborative 
manner. However, as with the concept of  transformation, 
there is no clear definition of  co-management in a South 
African context, even though it appears to be seen as 
a panacea by government and academia for sustainable 
utilitisation of  fisheries resources and economic 
development of  fishing communities. Experiences so far 
with fisheries co-management in South Africa (Hauck & 
Sowman 2003; Hara & Raakjær Nielsen 2003) indicate that 
the existing co-management arrangements have primarily 
focused on management of  the fish resources rather than 
being a mechanism for facilitating economic development 
within fishing communities. Except for KwaZulu-Natal, 
government has generally not taken on its responsibility 
for collaborative management seriously. In addition, 
one cannot expect poor communities and individuals 
to buy into the concept if  they cannot see that it would 
not improve their livelihoods. Thus, it will be important 
that poverty reduction strategies are embedded in co-
management arrangements. 
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Conclusion
Government’s intention for the redistribution of  fishing 
rights was for fish resources to contribute towards 
poverty alleviation in coastal communities.5 Isaacs (2003), 
and Hauck and Sowman (2003) all agree that allocating 
fishing rights to new entrants was a necessary step to start 
addressing the legacy of  apartheid’s economic and social 
deprivation of  black communities. The shift to Gear meant 
that government’s poverty alleviation approach focused 
on poverty prevention (through SMMEs) and poverty 
reduction (through job creation).6 It envisaged giving 
fishing rights to entrepreneurs within fishing communities 
who could start businesses using their rights, thereby 
creating jobs within these communities. While rights 
would act to reduce poverty for the rights holders and 
entrepreneurs, the creation of  jobs would prevent poverty 
for a few. It is clear, though, that the market solution 
(Gear) has been insufficient in effective transformation 
and contributing towards poverty alleviation in coastal 
communities. It is imperative, at least for the time being, 
that government should still play an interventionist role in 
order to ensure that transformation genuinely contributes 
to poverty alleviation. 
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Endnotes
* Moenieba Isaacs, PLAAS, misaacs@uwc.ac.za, Mafa 
Hara, PLAAS, mhara@uwc.ac.za, Jesper Raakjær 
Nielsen, Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal 
Community Development, Denmark, (jrn@ifm.dk), who 
was on subbatical at PLAAS between July 2004 and August 
2005.
1 Gear was largely based on the assumption that strong 
economic growth would result in creation of  greater wealth 
and that the benefits of  such increase in wealth would filter 
down to those at the bottom or margins of  the economy 
(the ‘trickle down’ theory).
2 The Fisheries Policy for South Africa (1996), Marine 
Fisheries White Paper (1997) and the Marine Living 
Resources Act (1998) were all embedded in this new neo-
liberal orthodoxy, which was quite different from the RDP 
policy approach advocated by ANC in the 1994 election.
3 Chambers (1989:1) refers to vulnerability ‘exposure to 
contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with 
them’.
4 The Acquisition group comprise of  Real Africa Investment 
Ltd., Brimstone Investment Corporation Ltd., fishermen’s 
associations, pelagic quota holders, local business interests 
and individual investors.
5 Bene (2004) uses the term poverty alleviation as an inclusive 
concept that encompasses poverty reduction and poverty 
prevention. 
6 Poverty reduction refers to wealth generation and capital 
accumulation through investment in fishing, whereas 
poverty prevention refers to the role of  fishing in helping 
people maintain a minimum standard of  living. Poverty 
reduction aims to lift people out of  poverty while poverty 
prevention aims to prevent people from falling deeper into 
poverty. The former should lead to economic growth and 
capital accumulation while the latter is aims to mitigate the 
impact of  poverty and reduce vulnerability.
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